6 min readApr 10, 2026 06:17 AM IST
First published on: Apr 10, 2026 at 06:17 AM IST
The declaration of a two-week pause in the Iran war has been greeted with a collective sigh of relief across a deeply anxious world. There will be endless analysis and speculation about who may have won and who may have lost the six-week war between Iran on one side and the US and Israel on the other. But that would be premature since this is not an end to the war, only the prospect of its end. US President Donald Trump has agreed to negotiate a more durable peace based on a set of 10 Iranian demands — all takes, no gives — conveyed through the good offices of Pakistan. There is no mention of the 15 points put forward by the US earlier. This one-sidedness is unusual in any negotiating exercise and puts Iran in an advantageous position. It suggests a certain urgency on Trump’s part to call a halt to the war, perhaps because of its mounting cost, its fuelling inflation in a year when crucial mid-term elections are due, and a recognition of Iran proving to be more resilient under fire than anticipated. One should expect the US to seek to extend the pause into a longer suspension of hostilities, always with the caveat that Trump’s unpredictability and impulsiveness could upend any rational calculation. Just a few hours before the ceasefire, he was threatening to “extinguish” Iranian civilisation if his demands were not met.
Pakistan has undeniably emerged as a key intermediary in the proposed negotiations to be hosted by it in Islamabad on April 10. It is reported that the powerful Speaker of the Majlis, Iran’s parliament, M B Ghalibaf, will lead the Iranian delegation. The US side may be led by Vice President J D Vance. China will be an unseen but influential presence. Trump publicly gave it credit for having contributed to the ceasefire. Pakistan will bask in the limelight, celebrating its return to geopolitical prominence, not as a spoiler but as a trusted intermediary, harking back to 1971, when it enabled Henry Kissinger’s secret visit to China. That India will merely watch from the sidelines, even though it is a major stakeholder in the Gulf and West Asia, will be savoured by Islamabad. It may be tempted into provocative behaviour towards India, feeling shielded, once again, by Washington and Beijing alike.
In dealing with this new situation, the temptation to engage in sharpened rhetoric and assertive diplomacy may be counterproductive. It may be prudent to monitor progress in the negotiations, convey goodwill and support to our Gulf and West Asian partners. They will value strong and reliable partners as they deal with the aftermath of the destructive war. The region will be reassessing its security architecture, which has hitherto been based on a string of US military bases hosted by them. But these failed to protect them from relentless Iranian missile and drone attacks. It also became obvious to them that for the Americans, the defence of Israel would always have priority over their security needs. There is no immediate alternative to reliance on the US, but a process of diversification will inevitably take place. India should get into pole position in this process by enhancing its defence collaboration with these countries. This should take place within a high-level dialogue on the transformed security landscape in a region of vital interest to India. The reconstruction and rehabilitation of infrastructure damaged in the war will also offer opportunities for a constructive role by Indian companies, which are already well entrenched in the region and have developed benign partnerships.
If India must contribute substantially to an enduring security architecture on its western flank, then it will need to recalibrate its relations with Israel and Iran. Israel will remain a valued security partner, but it should not inhibit the pursuit of our relations with other countries in the region in line with our interests. We should acknowledge that we let our relations with Iran slide while pursuing initiatives like I2U2 (Israel, India, the UAE and the US) and IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor), which excluded Iran and Turkey. In the wake of the Iran war, the US role in the region has become problematic, as has the prospect of a collaborative network of relationships between Israel and the Gulf countries. A US-led security architecture in the region, including Israel as a key pillar, has diminishing prospects. India inserting itself into such arrangements had some rationale in the past, but may have lost its relevance now. Irrespective of what happens in the coming negotiations, these broader trends unleashed by the war should be carefully assessed and acted upon. It is always better to stay ahead of the curve.
What about the larger geopolitical equations? The US has suffered grievous reputational damage both for its indulgence in unrestrained violence and its inability to pursue a well-crafted strategy with credible outcomes. It won on tactics but may have lost the war. This is the first time in the post-World War II period that the US was unable to mobilise support from its NATO and European allies. This confirms the perception of there no longer being a West with a coherent identity and shared values. China has gained in stature by default, and to a lesser extent, Russia. One should expect diminished US attention to the Indo-Pacific. It’s been stripped of military assets because of the Iran war. These will take time to be replenished. Its allies and partners in the region are already questioning the wisdom of outsourcing their security to the US. Japan and South Korea find themselves especially vulnerable.
One should also note the visit of the Taiwan Opposition leader, the head of the KMT party, to Beijing at the invitation of Chinese President Xi Jinping. China senses an opportunity to unify Taiwan with the mainland by convincing Taiwanese leaders and its people that they can no longer rely on the US for their defence. Trump’s forthcoming visit to China next month may provide a better sense of how far the US-China equation has now tilted towards the latter. These changes on our eastern flank, just as we must cope with the turmoil on our western flank, will throw up additional challenges for Indian diplomacy.
That will require a separate examination.
The writer is a former foreign secretary
