5 min readFeb 21, 2026 11:43 AM IST
First published on: Feb 21, 2026 at 11:43 AM IST
Donald Trump built his political brand on two promises meant to reinforce each other: Tighter borders and tougher trade. Tariffs were not a sideshow but were framed as leverage against China, against countries running surpluses with the United States, and, at times, even against neighbours accused of falling short in immigration enforcement.
That approach has now run into a legal tussle. On February 20, the US Supreme Court struck down most of Trump’s sweeping global tariffs as beyond statutory authority, holding that a 1977 emergency statute could not be used to impose blanket duties on imports. Trump’s reaction was immediate and predictably combative as he denounced the justices, called the decision “a disgrace”, and announced a temporary 10 per cent global tariff for 150 days under Section 122 while signalling he would pursue other legal routes to keep his tariff campaign alive. The question now is not whether tariffs disappear but what legal routes remain open, and how quickly they can be activated.
The White House had relied on a law originally designed for emergencies: The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). That statute lets a president regulate economic matters if a declared national emergency threatens US interests. In its ruling, the Court concluded that broad tariffs on imports are, in effect, taxes, and that, under the US Constitution, taxing authority during peacetime lies with Congress. However, the decision did not eliminate all US tariffs. Industry-specific levies, such as those on steel, aluminium, and certain electronics, imposed under separate legal authorities, remain in effect. What fell was the so-called global tariff regime that had been central to Trump’s trade narrative.
The political message was unmistakable: Setbacks in court will not derail the broader project. Trump hinted that the administration had alternatives, presenting the shift as a tactical adjustment rather than a retreat. Behind this rhetoric sits two calculations, one political and one practical.
Politically, tariffs remain a visible and immediate symbol of toughness on trade, and a core pillar of Trump’s narrative that America is being exploited by unfair foreign competition. For many supporters, especially in manufacturing and industrial regions, tariffs are tangible proof that the President is willing to act, whether or not they deliver a durable industrial revival. Set alongside Trump’s recurring emphasis on immigration and border security, the pattern becomes clear. The presidency is being cast as a posture of confrontation against outsiders, against domestic elites, and now, increasingly, against the judiciary.
In practice, the Court’s pushback does not end Trump’s ability to use tariffs, but it does make them harder to deploy quickly and broadly. If IEEPA cannot sustain blanket duties tied to immigration objectives or trade-imbalance arguments, the White House can still act through more established statutes, but only by accepting slower timelines and tighter legal predicates, including investigation-led routes such as Section 232 for national security tariffs, Section 301 for retaliation against unfair foreign practices, Section 122 for a short, time-capped balance-of-payments surcharge, and Section 201 safeguards for import-surges that injure domestic industry.
These pathways also bring three continuing constraints: World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules still shape what is lawful internationally and how retaliation is supposed to be channelled, domestic litigation risks shifts into trade courts and procedural challenges built around the administrative record, and Congress remains the constitutional owner of tariff power while often avoiding political responsibility for the costs, which is where uncertainty tends to persist.
A crucial but unresolved question from the Court’s decision is the fate of the billions already collected under the struck-down tariffs. Estimates suggested that the levies could have generated well over $175 billion in revenue; whether importers seek refunds or the government returns that money is now a matter for further litigation and political negotiation. On the global front, the ruling and Trump’s counterpunch have sparked anxiety among trading partners. Trade deals and negotiations built around the expectation of broad US tariff leverage may have lost their footing. In some cases, agreements signed under the shadow of tariff threats may be called into question now that the legal authority behind those threats has been curtailed. As the US heads into a midterm-cycle year in 2026, with immigration and trade as twin cornerstones of Trump’s messaging, the tariff issue will no doubt remain a staple of his stump speeches.
The writer is fellow, Centre for New Economic Diplomacy, ORF
